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146 PEOPLE v. BARCLAY f40 C.2d 
[Crim. No. 5356. In Bank. Jan. 9, 1953.) 
THE PEOPI.lE, Respondent, v. LOVELL BARCLAY, 
Appellant. 
[1] Homicide-Killing in Perpetration of Robbery.-A conviction 
of first dpgree murder is sustained by evidenrp that dl'fl'ndant 
killed a club owner in the commission of n robbery. (Pen. 
Code, § 189.) 
[2] Criminal Law-Instructions-Testimony of Accomplices.-Jf 
the uudisputl'd evidence establishes that a witness is an accoJl1-
plice, the jury should be so instructed. 
[3] Id.-Instructions-Testimony of Accomplices.-Where therp 
was evidence tending to negative the participation by witnesses 
in the robbery and murder charged, as where they testified 
that they knew nothing about the possibility of a robbery 
until they and others met in defendant's room, that they re-
fused to take part in a projected robbery of a place about 
100 miles away, that they drove with defendant and co-
defendant to the club, at which the crimes were committed, 
in the belief that the only purpose of the trip was to 
borrow a car, that they were afraid that if they refused 
to go to the club the car of one witness would be taken by 
force, and that they did not know until after they returned 
to defendant's room that any robbery of the club had been 
contemplated, the question whether they were accomplices 
to the crime for which defendant was on trial was properly 
left to determination of the jury, and it was not error to fail 
to instruct that they were accomplices as a matter of law. 
[4] Id.-Evidence-Accomplices and Corroboration.-If witnesses 
in a robbery and murder case were guilty as a matter of law 
of the crime of concealing a felony (Pen. Code, § 32), this 
would not in itself make them "liable to prosecution for the 
identical offense charged against the defendant on trial" 88 
required by Pen. Code, § 1111, defining an accomplice. 
[1) See Cal.Jur., Homicide, § 17; Homicidl', § 189. 
[3] Questions as to who are arcomplices, within rule requiring-
corroboration of their testimony, as one of law or fact, note, 19 
A.L.R.2d 1352. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Homicide, § 13(6); [2. 3] Criminal 
Law, ~ 826: [4] Criminal Law, § 574; [5] Criminal Law, § 1437(9): 
[6,7] Criminal Law,~68S: [8] Criminal Law,~S30; [9] Criminal 
Law, ~ 832; [10] Crilllinal Law, § 1382(28); [11 ] Criminal Law, 
~ 1382(31); [12] Robbery, § 31; [13] Robbery, § 35; [14) Criminal 
T·llW, §572; [15,16] Homicide, §242; [17-19) Homicide, §236. 
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[6] Id. - Appeal- Harmless Error - Instructions - Accomplice 
Testimony.-FlI.ilure t.o inl'<t.rup.f. t.hat a codefendant charged 
with robbl'ry alld mnral'r Will'< an aCllomplice as a matter of 
law was not reversihle enor where the court clearly and cor-
rectly instructed the jury on the definition of an accomplice, 
where the jury knew that he had been indicted with defendant, 
that' he testified that he had committed the crime and that he 
had withdrawn his plea of not guilty and entered a plea of 
guilty, and where the district attorney stated in his argument 
to the jury that "we feel that he was an accomplice, there is 
no doubt about it," as under these circumstances it is im-
probable that the jury considered that codefendant was not 
an accomplice and that a different verdict would have been 
reached had an instruction been given that he was an' accom-
plice. 
r 6] Id.-Instructions-Cautionary Instructions-Accomplices.-It 
is error to instruct the jury that an accomplice's testimony 
should be viewed with "caution" without also instructing the 
jury in the language of the statute. (See Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 2061(4).) 
[7] Id.-Instructions - Cautionary Instructions - Accomplices.-
An instruction that the testimony of an accomplice ought to 
be viewed with distrust, and that this means that the jury 
must give such testimony the weight to which the jury find 
it to be entitled after examining it with "care and caution" 
and in the light of all the evidence in the case, when read as a 
whole, is a correct statement of the law. 
[8] Id.-Instructions-Testimony of Accomplices.-An instruction 
in a murder and robbery case that "If 'either the crime of 
murder or robbery, the commission of which is alleged in the 
indictment, was committed by any of the witnesses in this 
case, then as a matter of law such witness was an accom-
plice, assuming that you find that the defendant .•• also 
participated in either of said crimes" is not objectionable as 
limiting the meaning of accomplice to one who' actually did 
or committed the criminal act, when such instruction is read 
with another instruction that "All persons concerned in the 
commission of a crime who either directly and actively com-
mit the act constituting the offense or who knowingly and 
with criminal intent aid and abet in its commission or, whether 
present or not, who advise and encourage its commission, are 
regarded by the law as principals in the crime thus com-
mitted and are equally guilty thereof." 
£9] Id. - Instructions - Testimony of Accomplices.-An instrue-
tion that "In determining whether or not the testimony of 
an accomplice has been corroborated as required by law, you 
must ... assume to be removed from the case the testimony 
) 
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of the accomplice, and then examine all other evidence with 
a view to determining if there be any inculpatory evidence, 
that is, eyidencc tending to connect the defendant with the 
commission of the offense," and that "If such other evidence 
does do that, then the testimony of the accomplice is cor-
roborated; if it does not, then there is no corroboration, al-
though the accomplice may be corroborated in regard to any 
number of facts sworn to by him," does not erroneously per-
mit the jury to find corroboration of the testimony of one 
accomplice in the testimony of other accomplices, when such 
instruction is read with another instruction that "The cor-
roboration of an accomplice required by law may not be sup-
plied by the testimony of one or more accomplices, but must 
come from other evidence or circumstances, or from the 
testimony of one or more witnesses who were not accom-
plices." 
[10] Id.-Appeal- Harmless Error - Evidence - Confessions of 
Others.-Any error in denying defendant's .motion for a mis-
trial on the ground that the confession of a codefendant was 
admissible at the trial of defendant only if such codefendant 
and defendant remained jointly on tria'l until the cause was 
submitted to the jury, and that such confession was not ad-
missible after codefendant withdrew his plea of not guilty, 
was not prejudicial to defendant where all matters set forth 
in the confession were subsequently in evidence when such co-
defendant testified as a witness for the People. ' 
[11] .Id.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Evidence-Expert Testimony. 
-Although a slip on a pillow taken from deceased's bed at the 
time of initial investigation of his room was missing when the 
pillow arrived at a laboratory for analysis, alleged error in 
allowing expert testimony regarding the similarity of fibres 
swept from the pillow with fibres swept from defendant's 
clothes, on the ground that when examined the pillow was 
not in the same condition as at the time of the murder, was 
not reversible where defendant failed to show how the absence 
of the pillow slip could have prejudiced him. 
[12] Robbery-Evidence.-Testimony of a codefendant that he 
was armed with a .38 revolver at the time of the robbery 
charged, if competent, supplies sufficient evidence to sustain 
a eonyiction of first degree robbery where defendant, although 
personally unarmed, aided and abetted the commission of the 
crime. (Pen. Code, §§ 31, 211a.) 
[13a,13b] Id.-Evidence-Corroborative Evidence.-Inasmuch as 
Pen. Code, § 1111, does not require that an accomplice be cor-
roborated as to every fact to which he testified but only that 
the corroborative evidence tend to connect defendant wi'th the 
commission of the crime in such a way as reasonably lllay 
satisfy a jury that the accomplice is telling the truth, it is not 
) 
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necessary to corroborate the testimony of an accomplice in a 
robbery case that a deadly weapon was used in the robbery 
where the testimony of other witnesses constitute sufficient 
corroborative evidence to connect defendant with the com-
mission of the crime. 
[14] Criminal Law-Evidence-Accomplices and Corroboration.-
Proof of the t'lements of a crime, as contrasted with proof of 
defendant's connection with the commission thereof, may rest 
on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. 
[16] Romicide-Punishment.-When a defendant is convicted of 
first degree murder, the jury determines his punishment as 
well as his guilt. 
[16] Id.-Punishment.-Since thc issues of punishment and guilt 
are determined at the same time in a murder case, to avoid 
prejudice to either the People or the accused by injection of 
collateral issues into the ease, evidence of the good or bad 
habits and background of the accused is generally held in-
admissible, and consideration of the jury is limited to the facts 
and circumstances attending commission of the offense itself. 
[17] Id.-Instructions-Punishment.-The jury is not allowed to 
weigh the possibility of parole or pardon in determining de-
fendant's guilt in a murder ease, and it is error to give an 
instruction which allows the jury to take into consideration 
the consequences of a recommendation of life imprisonment 
in arriving at that determination. 
(18] Id.-Instructions-Punishment.-To aid the jury in fixing 
defendant's punishment in a murder case, the court may in-
struct the jury as to consequences of the different penalties 
which may be impost'd so that an intelligent decision may be 
made. . 
[19] Id.-Instruction~Punishment.-An instruction suggested by 
defendant in a murder case that "he would not be subject to 
parole under any circumstances" was materially incorrect 
where, having had two prior convictions, he would have been 
pligible for parole in nine year". (Pen. Codp, ~ 3047.5.) 
APPEAL (automatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239) 
from a judgment of the Superior Court of Contra Costa 
County and from an order denying a new tria1. Wakefield 
Taylor, Judge. Affirmed. 
Prost'cution for murder and robbery. . Judgment of con-
viction of first degree murder imposing death penalty, and 
of first degree robberv. affirmed. 
) 
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George C. Carmody and Richard D. Sanders for Appellant. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Clarence A. Linn, 
Assistant Attorney General, Charles E. McClung, Deputy 
Attorney General, Francis W. Collins, District Attorney 
(Contra Costa) and Davit! J. Levy, Deputy District Attorney, 
for Hespondent. 
THAYNOR, J.-Defendant Lovell Barclay was charged by 
indictment with the murder and robbery of Alson G. Smith. 
He pleaded not guilty and admitted two prior felony con-
victions of robbery and one of manslaughter. A jury re-
turned verdicts of guilty of murder in the first degree with-
out recommendation and of robbery in the first degree. De-
fendant's motion for a new trial was denied, and he was 
sentenced to death on the murder conviction and to prison on 
the robbery conviction. The appeal to this court is auto-
matic. (Pen. Code, § 1239b.) 
Defendant operated a restaurant concession at the Hill-
top Club in Crockett, owned by Smith. On the evening of 
March 6, 1952, Daniel Ortiz, James Davis, and William Hat-
field, three acquaintances of defendant, drove to Crockett 
in Davis' car. They found defendant repairing his car and 
after some conversation the four men went to defendant's 
room in Crockett. The conversation turned to the subject 
of robbery, and Hatfield and defendant discussed the pos-
sibility of robbing a place about 100 miles away. Defendant 
said that his car was in poor mechanical condition, and the 
two men asked Davis if they could use his car. Davis refused. 
After some discussion, defendant suggested that Davis drive 
him to the Hilltop Club so that he could borrow the car of a 
bartender who worked there. Davis agreed and the four men 
arrived at the Hilltop Club at about 3 o'clock in the morning. 
Davis and Ortiz waited in the car. Hatfieid and defendant 
forced open a window and entered the club. Knowing that 
Smith kept most of his money in his room, the two men 
went upstairs. Hatfield entered the room first and found 
Smith asleep. He beat Smith until he was unconscious. The 
two men then ransacked the room and found Smith's wallet 
and several bags of silver. While their attention was dis-
tracted Smith rceoyered consciousness and sat up in bed. 
Hatfield, using defelldant's nickname, called out: "Frisco, 
what should I do'" Defendant said: "Man, you shouldn't 
have said my name ... I'll take care of him." Defendant 
threw a blanket over Smith's head. Hatfield turned his 
Jan. 195::$] PEOPLE tJ. BARCLAY 
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back as defendant beat Smith about the head for approxi-
mately a minute. The two men took the money and returned 
to the ear where Ortiz ana Davis were still waiting. 
Ortiz and Davis asked about the bartender's car, but de-
fendant and Hatfield laughed and told Davis to drive back 
to defendant's room. After they arrived, Davis and Ortiz 
saw Hatfield wash blood off his hands and watched the two 
men diyiue the money. Realizing that a crime had been 
eomlllitteu while Hatfield and defendant were in the club, 
Ortiz and Davis complained that they had become involved. 
They were given about $10 apiece and told to keep quiet. 
The four men separated and went home. 
Smith never regained consciousness and died the day after 
the robbery. The injuries received from the beating were 
the direct cause of his death. When Davis and Ortiz read 
in a newspaper that Smith had died, they informed the police 
of the crime, and Hatfield and defendant were apprehended. 
Hatfield and defendant were tried jointly. Ortiz and 
Davis testified as witnesses for the prosecution. Midway 
through the trial Hatfield withdrew his plea of not guilty 
and pleaded guilty. Subsequently he testified as a witness 
for the prosecution. An expert witness testified that he 
found fibres on defendant's clothes that matched fibres from 
the bedding on Smith's bed, and that he found dust on de-
fendant's clothes that matched dust on the roof of the Hilltop 
Club taken from the point where defendant and Hatfield 
made their entry. Defendant took the stand in his own 
behalf and testified that on the night of the murder he com-
pleted his work at the club at about 1 :30 and then went 
home to bed. He contended that Hatfield, Ortiz, and Davis 
had falsely accused him of the crime in order to avoid reo 
sponsibility for themselves. The jury rejected his defense 
and found him guilty. 
[1] Since the evidence in the present case shows that 
defendant killed Smith in the commission of a robbery, it 
is clearly sufficient to support the conviction of murder in 
the first degree. (Pen. Code, § 189; People v. Coejield, 37 
Ca1.2d 865, 868-869 [236 P.2d 570].) 
Defendant contends that the court erred in not instructing 
the jury that Davis, Ortiz, and Hatfield were accomplices as 
It matter of law. [2] An accomplice is "one who is liable 
to prosecution for the identical offense charged against the 
defendant on trial in the cause in which the testimony of 
the aecomplice is given." (Pen. Code, § 1111.) If the 
J 
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undisputed evidence establishes that a witness is an accom-
plice, the jury should be so instructed. (People v. Wallin, 32 
Ca1.2d 803, 809 f197 P.2d 734] ; People v. Ferlin, 203 Cal. 
587, 601 l265 P. 230]; People v. Coffey, 161 Cal. 433, 436 
L119 P. 901, 39 L.R.A.N.S. 704].) [3] Insofar as Davis 
and Ortiz are concerned, however, defendant's contention 
cannot be sustained. Davis and Ortiz testified that they knew 
nothing about the possibility of a robbery until the four men 
gathered ill defendant's room; that they refused to take part 
in the projected robbery 100 miles from Crockett; that 
they drove to the Hilltop Club with Hatfield and de-
fendant in the belief that the only purpose of the trip was 
to get the bartender's car; that they were afraid that if they 
refused to go to the Hilltop Club, Davis' car would be taken 
by force; and, that they did not know until after they re-
turned to defendant's room that any robbery of the Hilltop 
Club had been contemplated. From the testimony of Davis 
and Ortiz the jury' could reasonably conclude that the robbery 
of the Hilltop Club was an act independent of and foreign to 
the original criminal design to rob a place 100 miles away, 
and that Davis and Ortiz were thus not guilty of the murder 
and robbery of Smith. (People v. Harper, 25 Cal.2d 862, 
870-873 [156 P.2d 249] ; People v. Kauffman, 152 Cal. 331, 335 
[92 P. 861] ; see, also, Wharton's Criminal Law [12th ed.], 
§ 258; 15 C.J.S., Conspiracy, § 74.) Accordingly, the question 
whether or not Davis and Ortiz were accomplices to the crimes 
for which defendant was on trial was properly left to the de-
termination of the jury. (See cases collected in 19 A.L.R.2d 
1352.) [4] If it is assumed that, as contended by defendant, 
Davis and Ortiz were guilty as a matter of law of the crime 
of concealing a felony (Pen. Code, § 32), they still would nbt 
be "liable to prosecution for the identical offense charged 
against the defendant on trial" as required by section 1111. 
(People v. Collum, 122 Cal. 186, 187 [54 P. 589] ; see People 
v. Wallin, supra, 32 Cal.2d 803, 807.) 
[5] The People concede that Hatfield was an accomplice 
as a matter of law and that it was error not to so instruct 
the jury. The court, however, clearly and correctly instructed 
the jury on the definition of an accomplice. The jury knew 
that Hatfield had been indicted with defendant; they had 
heard his testimony that he committed the crime; they knew 
that he had withdrawn his plea of not guilty and entered a 
plea of guilty. The district attorney stated in his argument 
to the jury: "With Mr. Hatfield we feel that he was an accom-
plice; there is no doubt about it. As to Davis and Ortiz, you 
) 
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are to decide whether or not they are accomplices." Under 
these eircumstances, it is improbable that the jury considered 
that Hatfield was not an accomplice and that a different ver-
dirt would have been rE:ached had an instruction been given 
that hI' was an a(·complice. (See People v. Ferlin, su.pra, 203 
eal. 587, 601-602; People v. Wahni.~h, 20 Cal.App.2d 58, 63 
l66 P.2d 67i].) 
TllP only evidellce hl'fore the grand jury to connect de-
fendant with the crime was the testimony of Ortiz and Davis. 
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his 
motion to set aside the indictment, on the ground that it was 
not based upon evidence that would warrant a conviction by 
a trial jury. (Pen. Code, § 921; ct. Lorenson v. Superior 
Court, 35 Ca1.2d 49 [216 P.2d 859] ; People v. McRae, 31 
Ca1.2d 184 [187 P.2d 741].) It is unnecessary to pass upon 
this contention since, as we have seen, whether or not Ortiz 
and Davis were accomplices of defendant was a question of 
fact to be determined by the jury at the trial. 
At the request of the People, the jury was instructed that: 
"It is the law that the testimony of an accomplice ought 
to be viewed with distrust. This does not mean that you 
may arbitrarily disregard such testimony, but you should 
give to it the weight to which you find it to be entitled after 
examining it with care and caution and in the light of all 
the evidence in the case." Defendant criticizes the italicized 
part of the instruction, on the ground that the jury should 
have been iristructed only in the language- of section' 2061 (4) 
of the Code of Civil Procedure, that "the testimony of an 
accomplice ought to be viewed with distrust," and that the 
additional words "care and caution" prejudicially weakened 
t.hf' instruction. [6] It is error to instruct the jury that 
an accomplice's testimony should be viewed with "caution" 
withont also instructing the jury in the language of the 
statnte. (People v. Hamt1.ton, 33 Ca1.2d 45, "51 f198 P.2d 
R73] ; see, also. People v. Dat1., 22 Ca1.2d 642, 653 [140 P.2d 
R28].) [7] The instruction given in the present case, how-
eyer. rl'ad as a whole. is a correct statement of the law. 
(People v. Hess. 107 Ca1.App.2d 407, 430 [237 P.2d 568]; 
People v. Chapman. 93 Ca1.App.2d 365, 381 [209 P.2d 121].) 
[8] TIlt' jury was instructed t.hat: "If either the crime 
of 1Illll'Iler or roblwr~', the commission of which is alleged in 
the iJl(lil'1l1ll'llt. was committed by an~' of the witnesses in 
this cast'. then as a matter of law such witness was an 
accomplicf', assuming that you find that t.he defendant Bar-
) 
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clay also participated in either of said crimes." Defendant 
contends that the instruction erroneously informed the jury 
that "only one of the witnesses, for example, Hatfield, could 
be an accomplice, and not all of them." The instruction, 
however, expressly applied to "any" of the witnesses. De-
fendant also contends that the word "committed" in the 
instruction "eliminated from the definition of an accomplice 
the meaning that one who' participates,' that is to say aids 
or assists, or takes part in the crime, is an accomplice, and 
limited the meaning of accomplice to one who actually did 
or committed the criminal act." In another instruction, the 
jury was informed that: "All persons concerned in the com-
mission of a crime who either directly or actively commit the 
act constituting the offense or who knowingly and with crim-
inal intent aid and abet in its commission or, whether present 
or not, who advise and encourage its commission, are regarded 
by the law as principals in the crime thus committed and are 
equally guilty thereof." When the two instructions are read 
together, no error appears. 
[9] The jury was instructed that: "In determining 
whether or not the testimony of an accomplice has been 
corroborated as required by law, you must, for the purpose 
only of your consideration of that question, assume to be re-
moved from the case the testimony of the accomplice, and 
then examine all other evidence with a view to determining 
if there be any inculpatory evidence. that is, evidence tending 
to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense. 
If such other evidence does do that, then the testimony of 
the accomplice is corroborated; if it does not, then there is 
no corroboration, although the accomplice may be corroborated 
in regard to any number of facts sworn to by him." De-
fendant contends that the instruction erroneously permitted 
the jury to find corroboration of the testimony of one accom-
plice in the testimony of other accomplices, on the ground 
that it told the jury that the test of corroboration was whether, 
aside from the testimony of "the" accomplice, "all other 
evidence" tended to connect the defendant with the com-
mission of the offense. Defendant contends that "all other 
eyiflence" would inl'lude testimony of other accomplices so 
that the jlll'~', eYen though it found Davis and Ortiz to be 
3ccompli('t's, might Ilt'vertheless have considered their testi-
mony as corroborative of the testimony of Hatfield. In the 
instruction follo"'ing that quoted above, however, the jury 
was told that: "The corroboration of an accomplice required 
) 
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by law may not be snpplif'd by d1e t.estimony of one or more 
othf')' 1I(',~ompljet's. but must ('orne from ot.her eviriencc or 
cir"'IIIJ1shtlll'('s, or fl"f}m the t.('stiIllOIlY of olle or more wit-
nesses who were not accomplices." 'I'he two instructions, 
read together, correctly state the law. 
[10] Early in the trial a confession by Hatfield was ad-
mitted in evidence. The jury was instructed that it should 
not consider the confession as evidence against defendant. 
(See People v. Wade,71 Cal.App.2d 646, 652-65~ [163 P.2d 
59J.) Subsequently, Hatfield withdrew his plea of not guilty. 
The court denied defendant's motion for a mistrial and in-
structed the jury that the testimony regarding Hatfield's 
confession was struck from the record and must be disre-
garded. Hatfield later testified regarding all the matters 
set forth in his confession. Defendant now contends that his 
motion for a mistrial should have been granted, on the ground 
that the confession of Hatfield was admissible at the trial of 
defendant only if Hatfield and defendant remained jointly on 
trial until the cause was submitted to the jury. Since all 
matters set forth in the confession were subsequently in evi-
dence when Hatfield testified as a witness for the People, the 
error, if any, was not prejudicial to defendant. (People v. 
Simmons, 28 Ca1.2d 699, 721 [172 P.2d 18] ; People v. Higbee, 
78 Cal.App. 455,459 [248 P. 927].) 
[11] Police officers took the pillow and quilt from Smith's 
bed and sent them to a laboratory for analysis. At the time 
of the initial investigatio~ of Smith's room, the pillow was 
covered with a slip, but the slip was missing when the pillow 
arrived at the laboratory. The absence of the slip was never 
explained. Defendant contends that it was error to allow the 
expert witness to testify regarding the similarity of fibres 
swept from the pillow with fibres swept from' defendant's 
clothes, on the ground that when examined by the expert 
the pillow was not in the same condition as at the time of 
the murder. Defendant, however, does not show how the 
absence of the pillow slip could have prejudiced him in any 
way. 
[12] Defendant next contends that his conviction of 
robbery in the first degree is unsupported by competent evi-
Ilt·uee. Robbery is of the first degree when it "is perpetrated 
h~' torture or by a person being arme'd with a dangerous or 
deadly weapon." (Pen. Code, § 211a.) There is no evidence 
of torture in the present case, but Hatfield testified that he was 
/inned wth a .38 revolver at the time of the robbery. Hat-
) 
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fjpld '8 testimony, if competent, supplied sufficient evidence to 
sustain dpfelldant's ('oJl\'ietion of first degree robbery since 
defl'lIc1<l1It, IllthOllgh persoJlally unarmed, aided and abetted 
the CO)]llllission of tIll' crillJP. (Pen. Code, § 31; People v. 
Perkins, 37 Cal.2d 62, 64 l230 P.2d 353].) 
[13a] Defendant contends, however, that the fact that 
tllt'1"I' is no evidrnce to show that a deadly weapon was IIsed 
ill tile robbrry other than the testimony of Hatfield, ad-
mittedly all accomplice, rel/uires the judgment to be modified 
by reducing the degree of the crime to robbery in the second 
degree. (Pen. Code, § 1181; see People v. Mendes, 35 Ca1.2d 
537, 545-546 [219 P .2d 1].) This contention cannot be sus-
tained. Section 1111 of the Penal Code requires only that the 
corroborative evidence tend "to connect a defendant with 
the commission of the crime in such a way as reasonably may 
satisfy a jury that the accomplice is telling the truth. It is 
not necessary that the accomplice be corroborated as to every 
fact to which he testifies." (People v. Trujillo, 32 Ca1.2d 105, 
111 l194 P.2d 681] ; People v. Henderson, 34 Ca1.2d 340, 342-
343 [209 P .2d 785].) [14] Proof of the elements of the 
crime, as contrasted with proof of the connection of de-
fendant with the commission thereof, may rest upon the un-
corroborated testimony of an accomplice. (People v. Harper, 
25 Ca1.2d 862, 877 [156 P.2d 249] ; People v. Negra, 208 Cal. 
64, 69 [280 P. 354] ; People v. Griffin, 98 Cal.App.2d 1, 25 
[219 P.2d 519] ; People v. Briley, 9 Cal.App.2d 84, 86 [48 
P:2d 734] ; People v. Knowles, 75,Cal.App. 229, 230 [242 P. 
508] ; see 21 Cal.L.Rev. 247.) The testimony of Ortiz, Davis, 
and the expert witness constituted sufficient corroborative 
evidence to connect defendant with the commission of the 
crime of robbery. [lSb] It was unnecessary also to cor-
roborate the test.imony of Hatfield that a deadly weapon was 
Ilsed therein. 
The jury was instructed that it was in their discretion 
whether the death penalty should be inflicted,· Six hours 
*" The law of this !ltate provides that every person guilty of murdN 
in the first degree sllall suffer death or confinement in the state prison 
for life, at tIle discretion of the jury that finds him guilty. If you should 
find the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree, it will be your 
duty to determine which of the two penalties shall be inflicted, the death 
penalty or ronfinement in the stnte prison for life. If you should fix the 
penalty as confinement in the state prison for life, you will so indicate in 
your \'erdict. using a form that will be handed to you when you retire 
to deliberate, hut if you should fix the penalty as death, you will not 
8pecify the death penalty in your verdict, and you will say nothing about 
punishment in the verdict." 
) 
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after tile jury retired, it returned and the foreman asked: 
"The jury would like to review that portion of your instruc-
tions concerning what factors, if any, in law may be properly 
considered in determining whether the recommendation for 
life imprisonment may be included in returning the verdict." 
The court read again the instruction previously given. The 
foreman then asked: "In the recommendation 'as a punish-
ment therefor we find that he be imprisoned in the state 
prison during the term of his life'-does it mean exactly that, 
or is that sentence subject to termination by parole T" The 
court replied that he didn't believe it was "within the 
province of the jury to consider" that question. The court 
then discussed the question with counsel out of the presence 
of the jury. Counsel for defendant stated: "At this time 
the defendant asks the court to instruct the jury that because 
of the fact that a conviction of this offense would make him 
a habitual criminal that he would not be subject to parole 
1Iuder any circumstances." The court refused to give the 
l'(>qllested instruction and the jury returned to its delibera-
tions. Oue hour later the jury returned a verdict of murder 
in the first degree without recommendation. Defendant con-
tends that the ruling of the court was prejudicially erroneous, 
011 the ground that the jury may have fixed the punishment 
at death because of a mistaken belief that otherwise defendant 
might bE.' released from prison on parole within a few years 
(If his conviction. 
[15] Whe]] a dE.'fendant iR convicted of murder in the first 
clegrE.'e, the jury determines his punishment as well as his 
guilt. (Pen. Cod~, § 190; People v. Sainz, 162 Cal. 242, 246-
247 [121 P. 922]; ct. Pen. Code, § 209 [kidnapping with 
bodily harm]; Pen. Code, § 264 [rape of female under age 
18] . ) [16] Since the issues of punishment and guilt are 
det.ermined at tIle same time, there is danger that evidence 
or instrnctions offered on the former issue may influence the 
yprrlict on tlll' latter iSRue.Accordingly, to avoid prejudice 
to ('ith('r thc PE.'ople or the accused by injection of collateral 
issllcs into the case, evidence of the good or bad habits and 
bacltground of the accused is generally held inadmissible 
(People Y. Volenzuela, 7 Cal.2d 650, 653 [62 P.2rl142] ; People 
Y. W1:ft. 170 Cal. ]04, 110-]11 [148 P. 928] ; 8(>1'. also, People 
y. Lar1"':().~. 220 Cal. 236. 241,242 r30 P.2d 404] r comt in dis-
cl'etion lllay pl'rmit defendant to S]lOW "something of his back-
f!round"1 ), and the consideration of the jury is limited to the 
facts and circumstances attending the commission of the of-
) 
) 
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fense itself. (People v. Gosden, 6 Cal.2d 14, 30-31 [56 P.2d 
211] ; People v. Hall, 199 Cal. 451, 455 [249 P. 859] ; People 
v. Perry, 195 Cal. 623, 639 [234 P. 890] ; People v. Pantages, 
212 Cal. 237, 275 [297 P. 890] j see 11 So.Cal.L.Rev. 351.) 
[17] For similar reasons of policy the jury is not allowed 
to weigh the possibility of parole or pardon in determining 
the guilt of the defendant, and it is therefore error to give 
an instruction that allows the jury to take into consideration 
the consequences of a recommendation of life imprisonment 
ill arriving at that determination. (See People v. Letou,.neau, 
34 Cal.2d 478, 494 [211 P.2d 865J.) [18] To aid the jury 
in fixing the punishment of the defendant, however, the court 
may instruct the jury as to the consequences of the different 
penalties that may be imposed so that an intelligent decision 
may be made. (People v. Chessman, 38 Ca1.2d 166, 189-190 
[238 P.2d 1001J j People v. Osborn, 37 Ca1.2d 380, 384-385 
[231 P.2d 850J j People v. Caetano, 29 Ca1.2d 616, 619 [177 
P.2d 1] j People v. La Verne, 212 Cal. 29, 31 [297 P. 561] j 
People v. Hall, 199 Cal. 451, 459 [249 P. 859J; People v. 
Hong Ah Duck, 61 Cal. 387, 393.) In the Osborn case, the 
court informed the jury that a recommendation of life im-
prisonment without possibility of parole would not be bind-
ing, thus impliedly answering in the affirmative the question 
of the jury whether a person sentenced to life imprisonment 
might be paroled. We stated: "It is understandable that 
jurors, who are charged with the duty of fixing the penalty 
in the event that they find a defendant guilty of first degree 
murder, should be interested in knowing the nature and effect 
of the penalties which they may impose j and neither reason 
nor authority indicates that the trial court should be pro-
hibited from enlightening the jurors when questions are asked 
upon that subject." (37 Cal.2d at 385.) Recently, in People 
v. Chessman, supra, it was held that there was no error in in-
forming a jury that when a person is sentenced to life im-
.pri!;onment without possibility of parole there nevertheless 
re.mains the chance that the defendant will be freed by pardon, 
('ommutation, or action of the Legislature. The recent de-
cisions of this court thus establish that a jury may consider 
the consequences of a recommendation of life imprisonment 
in determining the punishment of the defendant, although it 
lIlay not consider tJle possible penalties in determining the 
guilt of the defendant. 
[19] The question remains whether error was committed 
in the present case. The instruction suggested by defendant 
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would have informpd the jury that "he would not be subject 
to parole lIndpr allY circnm!;tances." The instruction was 
materially incorrect. Since defendant had two· prior con-
victions, he would have been eligible for parole in nine years. 
(Pen. Code, § 3049.5.) All instructions actually given by the 
court on the subject of punishment were correct statements 
of the law under the decisions of this court; defendant cannot 
show that any correct instruction offered by him was refused. 
A t least under the circumstances of the present case, we do not 
think that the trial court was required to offer an additional 
instruction of its own motion. (Cf. Pwple v. Cook, 39 Cal. 
2d 496, 500 [247 P.2d 567].) 
The judgment and the order denying the motion for.a new 
trial are affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Schauer, 
.J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied February 
5, ·]953. 
*Since manslaughter is not one of the crimes enumerat.ed in section 
644 of the Penal Code, defendant's prior conviction of that crime did 
lIot affect his status as a habitual criminal. 
